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RESEARCH NOTE

RACIAL P R E J U D I C E AND S U P P O R T BY
WHITES F O R POLICE U S E OF
FORCE: A R E S E A R C H NOTE

STEVEN E. BARKAN
STEVEN F. COHN
University of Maine

The use of force by police in a democratic society continues to be controversial. Despite the theoretical and practical importance of police use of force,
little is known about the sources of public attitudes toward it. Recent research suggests that whites' approval of police use of force may derive
partly from racial prejudice against African Americans. In this paper we
test this possibility with data from the 1990 General Social Survey and find
that negative stereotypes of African Americans contribute to whites' support for police use of excessive force. We also address the theoretical and
pragmatic significance of our findings.

One of the most important but most controversial powers of police in a democratic society is the use of force (Bittner 1970; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993; Westley 1953). Police are authorized to use
physical violence when necessary, but police brutality, or the undue
use of force, remains a serious problem in the United States, especially for African Americans and other urban residents (Dudley
1991; Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert 1994; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993).
Perceptions of police brutality appear to be a major source of dissatisfaction with police among these citizens (Holmes 1991; Saad and
McAneny 1995; Wilkerson 1992).
Public opinion polls document racial differences in attitudes toward police use of force: African Americans are more likely than
whites to hold unfavorable views (Flanagan and Vaughn 1995;
Huang and Vaughn 1996; Williams, Thomas, and Singh 1983).
Surprisingly few researchers, however, have attempted to explain
these differences. In a recent exception, Cullen et al. (1996) examined racial differences among Cincinnati residents in support for
police use of deadly force. They found that whites were more likely
than African Americans to support such use, and attributed this
finding to ideological differences between the two races on crime
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and its control. Even so, more research on racial differences in attitudes toward police use of force, both deadly and nondeadly, is
needed if we are to consider other possible determinants of racial
differences.
In explaining whites' approval of police use of force, recent
work on support by whites for the punitive treatment of criminals
suggests an important avenue for investigation. Using data from
national surveys of U.S. residents, Barkan and Cohn (Barkan and
Cohn 1994; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991) found in multivariate analyses that prejudice against African Americans predicted whites' support both for harsher sentencing of criminals and
for capital punishment (also see Aquirre and Baker 1993).
These results support a conflict perspective on race, crime, and
society (Bohm 1982; Lynch and Groves 1989; Turk 1969). In this
view, the legal system is a means for the social control of
subordinate races and other groups. Despite historical evidence of
such control (Myers 1990; Tolnay and Beck 1995), there is considerable debate about whether the legal system works in this manner
today (Mann 1993; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 1996; Wilbanks
1987). Still, many whites perceive criminals as disproportionately
African American and members of other minority groups (Doleschal
1979; Smith 1991). Because racial prejudice often stems from
whites' vested interest in maintaining their social and political
dominance (Blalock 1967; Bonacich 1972, 1980), such prejudice
among whites should increase their desire for harsh criminal
sanctions.
Although Barkan and Cohn's (1994; Cohn et al. 1991) research
supported this perspective, it was incomplete in at least one important respect: It did not specify the conditions under which prejudice
would be more or less likely to affect preferred legal outcomes.
What are these conditions? To begin to answer this question, we
suggest that the effects of individual-level variables (including but
not limited to racial prejudice) will be greater when the appropriateness of legal sanctions is unclear. Whether or not people in privileged positions have the most to lose from crime (Lynch and Groves
1989), all people have an interest in not becoming crime victims;
thus everyone except criminals has an interest in seeing the crime
rate reduced. If this is true, people generally should wish to see
criminals punished where clear evidence of guilt exists and where it
is generally agreed that the legally prescribed sanctions are reasonable punishment for the offense. Therefore, the effects of personal
sentiments and attitudes should be attenuated in these situations,
but should be more apparent in situations where legal sanctions are
considered excessive or inappropriate.
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In regard to racial prejudice, this argument is supported indirectly by two related literatures. The first involves research testing
the "liberation hypothesis," originally advanced by Kalven and
Zeisel (1966) in their classic study of jury behavior. Kalven and
Zeisel found juries more likely to let their beliefs and values influence their decision making when the evidence against defendants
was weak than when it was strong. In effect, weak evidence "liberated" jurors to look beyond the law in reaching verdicts. Several
studies since then have found that race and other extralegal variables influence decision making by juries, judges, and prosecutors
more often in weak cases than in strong cases, and more often in
less serious than in more serious crimes (Baldus, Woodworth, and
Pulaski 1985; Barnett 1985; Reskin and Visher 1986; Spohn and
Cederblom 1991; Unnever and Hembroff 1988). The idea here is
that the strongest and most serious cases leave little room for discretion to affect decisions. Other cases permit more discretion and
increase the opportunity for racial bias and other extralegal factors
to play a role.
The second source of support for our argument comes from the
field of social psychology. In explaining racial prejudice, Gaertner
and Dovidio (1986) distinguish dominative from aversive racism. In
dominative racism, which they believe was more characteristic of
earlier periods of U.S. history, whites hold racially prejudiced attitudes and do not apply norms of equity to African Americans.
White dominative racists thus would be expected to discriminate
against African Americans in all situations. In aversive racism,
which Gaertner and Dovidio believe is more characteristic of the
United States today, whites hold conflicting attitudes toward African Americans: Although they are racially prejudiced, they also believe in fairness and equity. White aversive racists thus would not
be expected to discriminate in situations where norms of equity
clearly applied, but would be expected to do so in situations where
applicability of these norms was less clear.
These two literatures have an important implication for a link,
among whites, between racial prejudice and punitive attitudes, and
thus for a possible link between racial prejudice and support for
police use of force. Prejudice should affect punitiveness more
strongly under two conditions: (1) when the case against a suspect
or defendant is relatively weak, and (2) when the offender's alleged
wrongdoing is less serious. Specifically, racial prejudice among
whites should affect their support for police use of force more
strongly when the suspect's conduct is not perceived as meriting
such force (i.e., when such force is considered excessive) than when
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the suspect's conduct is so perceived (i.e., when such force is considered reasonable). We test this hypothesis below.
THE STUDY
Our data come from the 1990 wave of the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a national multistage probability sample of
the noninstitutionalized English-speaking U.S. population conducted regularly since 1972 by the National Opinion Research
Center. The 1990 GSS included a special module and other items
on racial prejudice that make it a desirable data set for this analysis (Barkan and Cohn 1994). We restrict our analysis to whites because they are the focus of our theoretical discussion.
The 1990 GSS contains four items measuring attitudes toward
police use of force. Respondents were asked to indicate whether
they would approve of a "policeman striking an adult male citizen"
if the citizen (a) "had said vulgar and obscene things to the policeman"; (b) "was being questioned as a suspect in a murder case"; (c)
'%vas attempting to escape from custody"; and (d) "was attacking the
policeman with his fists." A factor analysis distinguished items (a)
and (b) from items (c) and (d). As indicated by the responses to
these items reported in Table 1, this distinction appears to be based
on whether respondents approved of police use of force in the particular situation. Most people in the GSS sample disapproved of police violence in the situations represented by (a) and (b) and
approved of police violence in the situations represented by (c) and
(d). In the public's judgment, then, the use of police force in the first
two circumstances would be excessive, while the use of force in the
final two circumstances would be reasonable. 1 Our theoretical discussion thus would predict that racial prejudice should be related to
Table 1.

S u p p o r t b y Whites for P o l i c e U s e o f Force, 1990
G e n e r a l Social S u r v e y

Item
(a) Saying Vulgar and Obscene Things
(b) Suspect in Murder Case
(c) Attempting to Escape from Custody
(d) Attacking Policeman with Fists

Percent Approving
Use of Force
(Number of Respondents)
12 (717)
10 (720)
80 (709)
95 (733)

1 The U.S. Supreme Court outlined the legal standard for reasonable use of
force in G r a h a m v. Connor (1989), Earlier, in Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the Court
had prohibited the use of deadly force against nonviolent felons attempting to escape
custody.
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police use of force more strongly in the first pair of circumstances
than in the second pair.
Accordingly we added responses to the two pairs of items to
form two separate scales of approval for police use of force: excessive force (alpha reliability = .56) and reasonable force (alpha = .58).
Because of the skewness in each scale, we combined respondents in
the excessive force scale who said "yes" to either or both of the items
making up the scale (16%) and compared them ("approve" category)
in the multivariate analysis with those who said "no" to both items
(84%). Similarly, we combined respondents in the reasonable force
scale who said "no" to either or both of the items making up the
scale (21%) and compared them with those who said "yes" to both
items ("approve" category, 79%).
Two measures of racial prejudice are included in the analysis;
both measures predicted support for the death penalty among
whites in Barkan and Cohn's (1994) earlier study, net of other factors. The first measure, antipathy to blacks, is a scale of two items
asking respondents to indicate how strongly they favored or opposed "living in a neighborhood where half your neighbors were
Blacks," and "having a close relative or family member marry a
Black person" (alpha = .67) The second measure, racial stereotyping, is a scale of four items that asked respondents to indicate on
seven-point scales the degree to which they thought blacks were
lazy, unintelligent, desirous of living off welfare, and unpatriotic
(alpha = .62). A factor analysis distinguished the items in the stereotyping scale from those in the antipathy scale; the correlation of
the two scales (Pearson's r) was .35.
We included several other variables as controls for spurioushess. The first is political conservatism, a standard GSS item asking respondents to rate themselves on a seven-point scale. In prior
research, conservatism predicted support for various measures of
the social control of criminals (Gerber and Engelhardt-Greer 1996;
Langworthy and Whitehead 1986; Young 1992), including police
use of force (Cullen et al. 1996; Huang and Vaughn 1996). Another
variable, membership in a fundamentalist church, was suggested
by previous work linking fundamentalism to retributive attitudes
(Ellison and Sherkat 1993; Grasmick et al. 1992). We also considered it advisable to include a third variable, fear of crime, which
some (but not all) studies have found related to support for punitive
treatment of criminals (Cullen et al. 1985; Langworthy and Whitehead 1986). This variable is a standard GSS measure asking respondents whether there is "any area right around h e r e - - t h a t is,
within a mile--where you would be afraid to walk alone at night" (1
= yes, 0 = no).
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Three additional variables--education, age, and gender--also
have been linked to punitiveness, which generally decreases with
education and increases with age, and is greater for men than for
women (Stinchcombe et al. 1980). Partly in accordance with these
patterns, a recent national survey found that education was associated negatively and age was associated positively with favorable attitudes toward police use of force, b u t discovered no differences
between women and men (Huang and Vaughn 1996). Given the
historic evidence of racial prejudice in the south, we also included
southern residence as a control variable. Finally, we included the
population size of the respondents' place of interview, in view of the
greater police presence and higher crime rates in u r b a n areas.

RESULTS
Table 2 presents the bivariate correlations (Pearson's r) of each
predictor variable with the two measures of support for police use of
force. Both measures of racial prejudice are associated positively
with support for both types of police use of force.

Table 2.

Correlations (Pearson's r) o f P r e d i c t o r Variables
w i t h T w o Measures o f P o l i c e Use o f Force, 1990
General Social Survey

Independent Variables
Antipathy to Blacks
Racial Stereotyping
Political Conservatism
Fundamentalist Church
Fear of Crime
Education
Age
Gender (l=Male)
Southern Residence
Population Size

Coefficients
(Number of Cases)
Excessive Force
Reasonable Force
.19"**
.12"*
.07*
.13"*
.11"
-.11"*
.12"*
.07*
.07*
.01

(692)
(652)
(681)
(676)
(345)
(703)
(704)
(704)
(704)
(704)

.15"*
.07*
.08*
.09**
-.02
.02
.04
.14"**
.07*
.04

(696)
(654)
(684)
(680)
(352)
(706)
(707)
(707)
(707)
(707)

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; one-tailed tests
Support for both types is also higher among respondents who are
politically conservative, members of fundamentalist churches, men,
and southerners. Education is associated negatively and age is associated positively with support for excessive force, b u t neither is
associated with support for reasonable force.
Because each scale of approval of police use of force was dichotomous, logistic regression is an appropriate statistical technique for
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m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s . T h e r e s u l t s of o u r logistic r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y ses a p p e a r in T a b l e 3. 2 F o u r v a r i a b l e s s h o w i n d e p e n d e n t effects on
s u p p o r t for police u s e of excessive force. As h y p o t h e s i z e d , w h i t e s
w h o a c c e p t r a c i a l s t e r e o t y p e s of A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s a r e m o r e likely
to a p p r o v e of excessive force, n e t of all o t h e r factors. T h e " a n t i p a t h y to b l a c k s " m e a s u r e of r a c i a l prejudice, h o w e v e r , does not p r e d i c t
s u c h a p p r o v a l . O f t h e r e m a i n i n g v a r i a b l e s , a p p r o v a l is h i g h e r
a m o n g w h i t e s w h o b e l o n g to f u n d a m e n t a l i s t c h u r c h e s , w h o f e a r
w a l k i n g o u t s i d e t h e i r h o m e s a t night, a n d w h o a r e m a l e . I n r e s u l t s
n o t i n c l u d e d in t h e table, t h e i n d e p e n d e n t effect of t h e s t e r e o t y p i n g
scale on a p p r o v a l of excessive force w a s h i g h e r (r = .10) t h a n t h a t of
a n y of t h e o t h e r t h r e e v a r i a b l e s p r e d i c t i n g a p p r o v a l . I n t h e a n a l y sis for t h e r e a s o n a b l e force scale, no v a r i a b l e i n d e p e n d e n t l y affects
w h i t e s ' s u p p o r t for police u s e of s u c h force. O v e r a l l t h e r e s u l t s supp o r t o u r h y p o t h e s i s t h a t r a c i a l p r e j u d i c e c o n t r i b u t e s to w h i t e s ' supp o r t for police u s e of force, a n d t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s h o u l d be
s t r o n g e r for t h e u s e of excessive force t h a n for t h e u s e of r e a s o n a b l e
force.

Table 3. Logistic Regression of Whites' Support for Two
Measures of Police Use of Force, 1990 General
Social Survey (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Coefficients
Independent Variables

Excessive Force

Reasonable Force

Antipathy to Blacks
Racial Stereotyping
Political Conservatism
Fundamentalist Church
Fear of Crime
Education
Age
Gender (l=Male)
Southern Residence
Population Size
Constant
Goodness of Fit
Number of Cases

.14
.14"
.12
.75*
.66*
-.06
.01
.64*
-.19
.00
-5.95
299.61
299

.08
.05
.08
.46
-.40
.03
.01
.17
.56
.00
-1.30
297.50
302

* p < .05; one-tailed tests

2 Although the 1990 GSS included 1,150 whites, only about 300 remain in the
analyses reported in Table 3. This reduction occurred primarily because the primary
measures used in our analyses were given only to split samples, as indicated by the
number of cases listed in Tables 1 and 2. The subsample receiving the "fear of crime"
item was smaller than those given the other items (see Table 2), and especially
helped to reduce the number of cases remaining in the multivariate analyses
presented in Table 3. Although the number of whites in Table 3 is thus smaller than
the number of whites in the entire 1990 GSS, the cases in Table 3 remain a random
sample. Thus the results of this table are generalizable to the national population
represented by the GSS.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Drawing on several literatures, we predicted that racial prejudice among whites should be associated with their support for police use of excessive force. Although our scale of approval for such
force does not include all the possible situations in which it is used,
our results indicate that racial prejudice in fact contributes to
whites' approval of such behavior. This finding has important theoretical and policy implications.
Theoretically, our results indicate that previous findings linking racial prejudice to whites' support for harsher court sanctions
and for the death penalty (Aguirre and Baker 1993; Barkan and
Cohn 1994; Cohn et al. 1991) may be extended to the use of force by
the police, at least in the circumstances covered here. Future research should test our hypothesis against many of the other circumstances in which excessive force is used. Further, our results, in
accordance with our predictions following the liberation hypothesis
and the distinction between dominative and aversive racism, help
to specify the conditions under which racial prejudice affects approval of such force: Racial prejudice increases whites' support for
the use of excessive force by police, but not for the use of reasonable
force. Again, future research should test this hypothesis against
the many circumstances in which either type of force is used. Our
study thus complements findings of racially based outcomes from
previous research grounded in the liberation hypothesis (Spohn and
Cederblom 1991).
As for policy implications, in discussing concern about crime in
the United States, observers often argue that crime is a code word
for race (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Hacker 1992; LaFree 1995; Skogan 1995). Despite the assumption that public concern about crime
partly reflects whites' prejudice against African Americans, few researchers have tested whether this is the case. In studies of national (GSS) data, however, Skogan (1995) recently found racial
prejudice among whites linked to their fear of crime, and Barkan
and Cohn (1994; Coh_n et al. 1991) found that racial prejudice motivated whites' approval for the harsher sentencing of criminals and
for the death penalty. In the present study we have learned that
prejudice also motivates whites' approval of excessive police
violence.
This set of findings supports assumptions that prejudice
against African Americans partially underlies public (i.e., whites')
calls for harsher treatment of criminals. In a democratic society it
is unacceptable for racial prejudice to guide public policy. Insofar
as racial prejudice motivates calls by the public and perhaps by
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public officials for the harsher treatment of criminals, such treatment is unjustified. Our study and the work of Skogan (1995) and
Barkan and Cohn (1994; Cohn et al. 1991) provide grounds for resisting such calls.
Given the theoretical and practical importance of police use of
force, additional investigations of public views on such behavior are
essential. These investigations would benefit from more comprehensive measures of the use of both excessive and reasonable force.
More generally, our results reinforce the need for research on racial
bias in public attitudes about crime and punishment, and in criminal justice outcomes, to specify the conditions under which such
bias might or might not appear.
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